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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KIM L. NORRIS, LEX R. 
NORRIS, et al. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
A. M. ANDERSON and NORA S. 
ANDERSON, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 15,718 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to compel specific performance of an 
agreement to sell certain real property and to collect a 
real estate commission for the real estate agency handling 
the transaction. 
DISPOSITION IN A LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Court on February 1, 
1978, the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge, sitting without 
a jury, and on February 14, 1978, the Court filed its decision, 
dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff, no cause of 
action. (R. 34-36). The Decree and Judgment reflecting the 
decision of the Court was signed by the Court on February 
24, 1978. (R. 15-16). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the judgment of the trial 
court and an Order of this Court compelling specific performance 
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and awarding a real estate commission, including attorneys 
fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs in this action, Kim L. Norris, Lex R. 
Norris, and Lanny T. Norris are all brothers and are partners 
doing business as LKL Associates. Taylor National Real 
Estate, the other plaintiff, is a real estate agency located 
in Orem, Utah. The defendants, A. M. Anderson and Nora s. 
Anderson, are also residents of Orem, Utah, and are the 
owners of a certain parcel of real property which is the 
subject matter of the dispute. 
In September of 1976, the defendants listed their 
property through Boley ·Realty on the Utah County Multiple 
Listing Service, (P. Exhibit 1), agreeing to pay a 6% 
commission in accordance with the terms of the listing. On 
January 7, 1977, the plaintiffs, LKL Associates, through 
their agent, Bryce K. Taylor, of Taylor National Real Estate, 
submitted an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase to 
the Andersons which constituted an offer to purchase the 
subject property for $250,000.00. (P. Exhibit 2). The 
Offer to Purchase was given to the ll.ndersons at their home by 
Mr. Taylor through Mr. Dean Hall, of Boley Realty. At the 
time the offer was presented, it contained only the infor-
mation through line 57. (T. 12, 26). After receiving the offer, 
Hall and the Andersons upon the encouragement of Mr. Hall 
went to see Mr. Boley about making a counter-offer. (T. 
13, 118-119). At that meeting between the Andersons, Hall 
-2-
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and Boley, a counter-offer of seven points was drawn up upon 
the stationery of Boley Realty. That document is attached 
to plaintiffs' Exhibit 2 as page 2. (T. 13). The document 
was dated January 11, 1977 and signed by Mr. and Mrs. Anderson. 
(T. 14). At the same time, the Andersons put an "X" through 
certain portions on the face of the original Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase. Mr. Anderson stated that the 
counter-off er took the place of the portion that had been 
crossed out, but that he agreed with all of the other terms 
of the original offer. (T. 14-15). Also on January 11, 
1977, additional hand written terms to the counter-offer 
were added to the face of the original Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase which statement was also subscribed by 
the Andersons. That statement is really the key to this 
litigation and states as follows: 
"Seller agrees to the terms above 
stated with the incorporation of the 
seven points outlined on the attached 
amendment sheet. Subject to buyers 
acceptance within five days. 
Dated January 11 - 1977 
A. M. Anderson 
Nora s. Anderson" (P. Exhibit 2). 
Mr. Bryce Taylor was present in the home of the Andersons 
when the counter-offers were signed and dated, and the 
documents were given to Mr. Taylor on January 11 to convey 
to the Norrises. (T. 29). Mr. Taylor was unable to convey 
the counter-offer to the Norrises until January 12. Finally, 
:::..-' 
on January 14, 1977, the plaintiffs, through Kim Norris, 
prepared an acceptance of the counter-offer and wrote that 
-3-
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acceptance on the bottom of the second page of Bxhibit 2. 
That acceptance stated as follows: 
"Buyer agrees to counter-offer 
subject to d~__<2..!_2Q_'__~<!9~m~nt 
ana subject to seller's acceptance 
of second mortgage provision contained 
in original offer. 
Kirn L. Norris 
Jan. 14, 1977" 
(P. Exhibit 2). 
Taylor then called Hall and told Hall that he had a 
conditional acceptance of the counter-offer of the Andersons 
and that the parties needed to get another meeting together 
with the Andersons. Taylor, Hall and the Andersons met on 
the afternoon of Saturday, January 15, 1977. (T. 16-17, 30-
31). The Andersons at the time were hurrying to a church 
meeting but the individuals did have a short meeting in 
which Anderson indicated that he was not anxious to delete 
the two items from his counter-offer but that, he would have 
to consider the matter. (T. 122). Taylor recalled that 
the parties had agreed to communicate again on Monday, the 
17th of January, concerning the transaction, (T. 34), but 
Mr. Anderson stated that there was nothing definite said 
about any meeting on the 17th. (T. 17). In any event, the 
spirit of the meeting on Saturday, the 15th of January was 
that there may be some possibility of compromise and solving 
the differences between the parties. (T. 32-34). 
On the morning of January~~l977, Dean Hall called 
Mr. Taylor and informed him that Anderson had decided to 
-4-
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stick with the original seven points rather than to compromise 
as had been discussed on Saturday. (T. 122). 
Anderson denied that he told Hall on the morning of the ~-----------------.--- -----------=------
17th that he would have to stand by the original counter-
offer but instead testified that his communication with Hall 
on the morning of the 17th was to the effect that the counter-
offer had expired and that the deal would be off. (T. 19-
20). However, Mr. Hall testified that when he called Anderson 
on the morning of the 17th to see how he felt about the two 
provisions, that the only thing Anderson said, was, "that in 
no way did he want to relinquish on either point". (T. 
122). Immediately thereafter, Hall called Taylor and told 
him what Anderson had said. (T. 123). 
On the morning of January 18, 1977, Mr. Taylor called 
Mr. Hall and told Hall that the Norrises had accepted the 
Andersons' counteroffer as originally written, including all 
seven points. (T. 35-36, 123-124). That telephone call by 
Taylor to Hall was initiated after Lanny L. Norris had 
written on the bottom of page two of Exhibit 2, the following 
words: 
"The buyer accepts counter-offer as written. 
Lanny L. Norris 
January 18, 1977. 
(P. Exhibit 2). 
At the same time, Mr. Norris crossed out that portion 
of page 2 which had previously been written by Mr. Rim 
Norris on January 14, 1977. 
-5-
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Upon communicating to Hall that the Norris' had accepted 
the offer as written, Mr. Taylor requested that Hall and 
Taylor again meet with the Andersons to get their initials 
on the counter-offer. Hall told Taylor that Hall would call 
the Andersons and arrange the meeting. Hall called about 30 
minutes later and told Taylor that Anderson was engaged the 
night of January 18, and would not be able to meet but that 
they could go to Anderson's place on the morning of January 
19. (T36). 
The following morning, Taylor and Hall went to the 
Anderson home with Mr. Hall ariving some time prior to 
Taylor. As soon as Taylor arrived, he was told by Hall that 
Hall was presenting another offer from Mr. Boley to the 
Andersons and that the Andersons were considering that offer 
at that point. Some time thereafter, Mr. Paul Taylor, father 
of Bryce Taylor, also arrived at the Anderson home. (T. 37). 
Taylor had exhibit 2 with him at the meeting on top of his 
file or in his opened file which was on top of his briefcase. 
(T. 48). The meeting terminated when Mr. Anderson indicated 
that he was not accepting anyone's offer and refused further 
negotiations. Later, on the afternoon of the 19th, Kim and 
Lanny Norris visited with Anderson at which time Anderson told 
them that if they had accepted within five days, "they would 
have bought the place." (T. 24). 
Mr. Bryce Taylor subsequently sent a completed copy of 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase including 
page 2 as signed and modified by all of the parties to 
-6-
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the Andersons that was received by Mr. Anderson on February 
17, 1977. 
After trial of the matter, the court found that the 
offer originally submitted by the Norris brothers was rejected 
by the Andersons on January 11, 1977 at which time a counter-
offer was made "subject to buyers acceptance within five 
days". The court also found that the "conditional acceptancen 
of the plaintiffs of January 14, was discussed by the parties, 
both through the real estate agents and at the meeting of 
January-15, between the Andersons, Hall and Taylor. The 
court found that there was no acceptance of the counter-
offer at that meeting althrough there was some discussion 
that a solution to the problem of the right-of-way and the 
second mortgage provision may be had but that the Andersons 
wished to consider those matters further. There was also a 
finding that on the 17th of January, the Andersons advised 
Hall that they could not delete the two conditions and that 
the counter-offer as submitted was all the Andersons would 
accept. 
The Court held that pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§68-3-8, the 16th of January being a Sunday was not counted 
so that the plaintiffs had through the 17th of January to 
accept the counteroffer of the defendants. There was a 
further finding that the "conditional acceptance" of the 
plaintiffs contained in the four lines which were crossed 
out on the second page of Exhibit 2 amounted to a rejection 
of the counter-offer, which could not, by a subsequent act 
-7-
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of the rejecting offeree, be accepted in the original form 
of the counter-offer. The Court made no specific findings 
or comments as to the second cause of action of the plaintiffs' 
complaint concerning the real estate commission but the 
Court dismissed both the first and second cause of action of 
the plaintiffs' complaint. (R. 34-36, 17-20). 
It is the plaintiffs' contention that the trial court 
erred in failing to compel specific performance by the 
defendants and erred in failing to award a commission to 
the plaintiff, Taylor National Real Estate Company. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPEL SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE. 
The trial court based its decision to dismiss the first 
cause of action of plaintiffs' complaint, upon three premises: 
(1) That the plaintiffs did not accept defendants' 
counter-offer within the time period required by the terms of 
the counter-offer; 
(2) That the conditional acceptance of the plaintiffs 
was in reality a rejection of the counter-offer and a new 
offer and therefore, the original offer could not be subsequent~ 
accepted, and 
(3) That there was no conduct on the part of defendants 
to either extend the five day period or that constituted a 
waiver of that lmiitation. (R. 17-20, 34-36). 
The plaintiffs claim there was timely acceptance by 
them and that the Court should have compelled specific 
-8-
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-performance. 
Because of the various transactions between the parties, 
it is difficult to put a rigorous legal label upon each of the 
transactions so that it becomes a "offer", "counter-offer", 
etc. Plaintiffs submit, however, that the only logical 
interpretation of the actions of the parties is that there 
was an original offer submitted by the plaintiffs on January 
7, 1977, which was rejected by the counter-offer of the 
defendants dated January 11, 1977. There was a conditional 
acceptance of the counter-offer on January 14, 1977, which 
conditional acceptance was, in fact, a counter-offer to the 
counter-offer. The defendants rejected the counter-offer or 
conditional acceptance by reaffirming or reinstating their 
original counter-offer. That reinstatement happened on 
January 17, 1977 and that reinstatement became a third 
counter-offer which was ultimately accepted on January 18, 
1977. This characterization of the activities of the parties 
is supported by the general rules found at 17 Am Jur 2d, 
378, Contracts, §39; 
An offer is rejected by a counter-
offer, and in this respect a qualified 
or conditional acceptance constitutes a 
counter-offer. 
And, 17 Am. Jur. 2d 401 Contracts, §62: 
"If a condition is affixed to the 
acceptance by the party to whom the 
offer is made, or any modification of 
or change in the offer is made or req-
uested, there is a rejection of the 
offer which puts an end to the negotiation, 
unless the party who made the original 
offer renews it or assents to the modi 
fication suggested." 
-9-
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This general principle is supported by the case of 
Burton v. Coombs, 557 P.2d 148 (Utah 1976), which was so 
heavily relied upon by the defendants at trial. In that 
case, the plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court to compel the 
defendants to honor an acceptance of a settlement offer 
which was communicated to the defendants prior to trial, but 
which was rejected by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed 
that during the trial the offer was renewed and that the 
plaintiffs were therefore entitled to accept the offer of 
settlement and bind the defendants thereto. The court held, 
however, that there was no reinstatement of the offer by the 
defendants, and therefore, there was nothing to be accepted 
by the plaintiffs. In so holding, the Supreme Court implied 
that where there has been a reinstatement an offer after it 
has been rejected, it is susceptible to acceptance. The 
court stated: 
Plaintiffs, by their words and expressly 
refusing the offer tendered at the beginning 
of trial and by their conduct in proceeding 
with litigation, effectively terminated the 
rights and liability of the parties to the 
proposed settlement. It was impossible for 
plaintiffs to assert acceptance at a later time 
unless defendants had expressly renewed their 
offer, and the record does not show that this 
was done. 
In the present case there was a firm and absolute renewal 
of the counter-offer by the defendants on January 17, 1977, 
and the plaintiffs accepted the counter-offer on January 18, 
1977. 
The five day period was not expressly mentioned in the 
reinstatement of the counter-offer, but even if the five day 
-10-
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requirement was reinstated on the 17th with the renewal of 
the offer, the plaintiffs, of course, accepted within the 
five day period. 
If the Court determines that the original counter-offer 
of January 11th is the controlling offer, then the plaintiffs' 
timely accepted in any event. 
While the offer stated that it was "subject to buyers 
acceptance within five days", it did not state when the five 
day period commenced to run. The question is "within five 
days frbm what?" 
While the counter-offer was signed and dated January 
11, 1977, the five day period did not commence to run until 
the counter-offer was actually received by the purchasers. 
It is undisputed in the present case that the Norris' did 
not have a counter-offer in their hands until January 12, 
1977. Since an offer is not considered made until it is 
actually received by the offeree, 17 Am.Jur.2d 369, Contracts 
§31, the condition that the purchaser accept "within five 
days" had no meaning until the offer was received by the 
Norrises. In other words, the Norrises were entitled to 
accept "within five days" after the offer was received by 
them. 
It is general rule that when an act is required to be 
performed within a specified period of time, the rule is to 
exclude the first day and to exclude Sunday's, if the period 
of time is less than seven days. These rules are generally 
stated as follows: 
-11-
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Formerly, where a computation of time 
was to be made from an act done or from the 
time of an act, the day when the act was 
done was to be included. However, at the 
present time, both in the construction of 
contracts and statutes as well as in matters 
of practice when time is to be computed from 
a particular day or when an act is to be per-
formed within a specified period from or 
after a day named, the rule is to exclude 
the first day and to include the last day 
of the specified period, except when a cer-
tain number of the entire days are reCI,\!ired to 
intervene, in which case both the first and 
last days are excluded. In many jurisdic-
tions, the rule excluding the first day 
and including the last is incorporated in 
statutes defining computation of time. Under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in com-
puting periods of time prescribed by order 
of court or by any applicable statute, the 
day of the act, event, or default after 
which the designated period of time begins 
to run is not to be included, but the last 
day of the period so computed is to be included 
unless it is Sunday or a legal holiday. In 
the absence of anything showing an intention 
to count only "clear" or "entire" days, it 
is generally held that in computing the time 
for performance of an act or event which must 
take place a certain number of days before a 
known future day, one of the terminal days 
is included in the count and the other is ex-
cluded. However, a computation made by exclu-
ding both first and last days has frequently 
been employed, either as a general rule in 
some jurisdictions, or, in other jurisdictions, 
where it appears that there was an intention 
to county only "clear" or "entire" days. 
In the absence of a controlling statutory 
provision. which fixes an absolute rule of 
computation, the courts will as a general rule 
adopt that construction which will uphold and 
enforce, rather than destroy, bona fide trans-
actions and titles; whenever it is necessary 
to prevent a forfeiture or to effectuate the 
clear intention of the parties, the dies a quo 
will be included. Further, where it is pro-
vided that a certain result shall not accrue 
until after the expiration of a given number 
of days from a stated date, then both the 
first and last days must be excluded, so that 
the full number of days will be allowed. 
74 Am.Jr.2d 597, Time §15. 
-12-
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Where a limitation of time is fixed by 
statute within which an act is required 
to be performed, and the time stipulated 
for performance does not exceed a week, 
Sunday will be excluded in the computa-
tion of the time without an express 
statutory requirement to that effect; 
but when the time stipulated must nec-
essarily include one or more Sundays, 
those days will not be excluded, in the 
absence of an express proviso for their 
exclusion. This general principle is 
held applicable to contracts, by a num-
ber of authorities, so that where an 
act is required to be done in a certain 
number of days exceeding a week, Sunday 
is included in the computations; but 
if the number of days is less than-?, 
Sunday is not counted. 
74 Am. Jur. 2d 603, Time § 20. 
This general rule is supported in Utah by statutes as 
follows: 
U.C.A. 68-3-7, Time, how computed. 
The time in which any act provided by 
law is to be done is computed by excl-
uding the first day and including the 
last, unless the last is a holiday, and 
then it is also excluded. 
U.C.A. 63-13-2 Legal Holidays-Governor 
Authorized to Declare Additional Days. 
* * * (2) For the period beginning with the 
effective date of this act, [Feb. 6, 
1970], the following-named days are 
legal holidays in this state: every 
Sunday * * * 
In the present case, the only days that would be counted 
would be January 13, 14, 15, 17, and 18. Since the plaintiffs' 
unqualified acceptance was communicated to the defendants on 
January 18, they are entitled to specific performance of the 
contract. 
-13-
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POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF, TAYLOR NATIONAL REAL RSTATE, IS ENTITLED 
TO A COMMISSION FOR FINDING A BUYER WHO WAS READY, WILLING 
AND ABLE TO PURCHASE. 
The common way for a seller to employ real estate 
brokers to sell his property is to list the property with a 
multiple listing service, thereby giving the seller the 
benefit of the efforts of several brokers and agents. The 
relevant portions of the listing agreement currently used by 
the Utah C?unty Board of Realtors, and the ones with which 
we are concerned in the present case are as follows: 
In consideration of your agreement to 
list the property described herein and to use 
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser or 
tenant therefor, I hereby grant you for the 
period of six months from date hereof the exc-
lusive right to sell, lease or exchange said 
property or any part thereof, at the price 
and terms stated hereon, or at such other price 
or terms to which I may agree in writing. 
During the life of this contract, if you find 
a party who is ready, able and willing to buy, 
lease or exchange said property or any part 
thereof, at said price and terms, or any 
other price or terms, to which I may agree 
in writing, or if said property or any part 
thereof is sold, leased or exchanged during 
said term by myself or any other party, I 
agree to pay you a commission of six percent 
for such sale, lease or exchange. Should 
said property be sold, leased or exchanged 
within six months after such expiration to 
any party to who the property was offered or 
shown by me, or you, or any other party during 
the terms of this listing, I agree to pay you 
the commission above stated. 
* * * 
In case of the employment of an attorney to 
enforce any of the terms of this agreement, I 
agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee and 
all costs of collection. 
* * * 
-14-
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You are hereby authorizea ana instructea to 
offer this property thru the Multiple Listing 
Service of the Utah County Boara of Realtors. 
* * * 
The Courts of Utah have long recognized the general 
rule that unaer a listing agreement which requires a real 
estate broker to fina a buyer who is reaay, willing ana able 
to buy, the broker is entitlea to a commission when he finas 
such a buyer, even if the transaction is not actually consummated. 
Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 P.2d 237 (1954); 
Garff Realty Co. v. Better Builaings, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 
234 P.2a 842 (1951); Reich v. Christopulos, 123 Utah 137, 
256 P.2a 238 (1953); Ogden Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Blakely, 
66 Utah 229, 241 P.221 (1925); Martineau v. Hanson, 47 Utah 
549, 155 P.432 (1916). 
In Curtis v. Mortensen, supra, the plaintiff real 
estate broker securea a six month listing agreement from the 
defenaant seller which proviaea that if a buyer was founa 
who was ready, willing and able to buy the property, a 
commission woula be paid. A purchaser was found within the 
six month period and an earnest money agreement was signea 
by the salesman as agent for the buyers and was signed by 
the sellers. Thereafter, the sellers rescindea the earnest 
money agreement and attemptea to rescind the listing agreement. 
The sellers refusea to sell to the potential buyers ana the 
deal collapsea. The broker brou~ht an action to recover his 
commission under the listing agreement. The broker appealed 
from a trial court aecision aaverse to him and the Supreme 
Court reversea in his favor. The Court held: 
-lS-
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The sale was never consummated because 
respondents changed their minds and refused 
to sell and not because the buyers refused 
to make a binding agreement. Under such 
circumstances appellants have fulfilled 
their part of the listing agreement by 
having produced purchasers who were ready, 
willing and able to buy the listed property 
and are entitled to their commission. 
Such were the terms of the listing agreement 
made by the parties. There was no require-
ment that a binding contract be entered into 
and for us to add that requirement would be 
to make a new contract for them. This we 
may not do. As stated in 8 Am. Jur. Sec. 
184, page 1097: 
"Once the broker has procured a 
person who is able, ready and 
willing to purchase on the terms 
offered by the owner, he is entitled 
to commission, even though the 
failure to complete the contract 
is due to the default or refusal 
of the employer." 
This court in Little and Little v. 
Fleishman, 35 Utah 566, on page 568, 101 
P. 984, on page 984, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 
1182, indicated it was in accord with 
the above statement, even though it was 
unnecessary to a decision of that case 
since a binding offer had been obtained 
by the owner, by saying: 
"* * * The substantial features of the 
agreement between plaintiffs and the 
defendant are that the plaintiffs were 
employed to effect, not consummate, a 
sale, and were entitled to a commission 
in the event of a sale at any price agreed 
upon. When the plaintiff obtained and 
produced a purchaser who was able, ready 
and willing to purchase for the price, and 
on the terms proposed they did all that 
was required to them, and the owner 
could not, under the terms of his contract 
with them, arbitrarily refuse to sell 
and decline to enter into negotations of 
a sale with the proposed purchaser without 
becoming liable to plaintiffs for their 
commission. 
-16-
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See also Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Utah, 261, 
P.2d 927, Down v. DeGroot, 83 Cal, App. 
115, 256 P.438 and Peeler v. Bean, Tex. 
Civ. App., 38 S.W. 2d 395. 
In a similar factual setting, the Court in Garff Realty Co. 
v. Better Buildings Inc., supra, at 843, held that where a 
real estate broker procured the signature of a purchaser on 
an earnest money receipt and agreement for purchase, there 
was legal consideration for the promise of the vendor to pay 
a commission to the broker and the broker was-entitled to 
recover the commission. 
There are a host of cases in which it has been recognized 
that the right to compensation on the part of a real estate 
broker employed to effect a sale of property who has produced 
a person ready, able and willing to purchase the property 
upon the terms stipulated inthe brokerage listing agreement, 
it not lost by a failure of completion of the transaction, 
where such failure is due to the refusal of the seller to go 
through with the sale. Curtis v. Mortensen, supra, 169 
A.L.R. 605: Right of Real-Estate Broker, Employed to Effect 
or Consummate Sale, to Compensation Where Principal Refuses 
or is Unable to Complete Transaction; 12 Am. Jur. 2d 922, 
Brokers §183 and cases cited therein. 
This Court has recognized that where a broker, employed 
to effect the sale of real estate, obtains a written earnest 
money agreement containing the terms of sale as agreed upon 
in the listing agreement signed by a prospective purchaser 
Who is ready, able and willing to perform upon the terms 
agreed upon, the contract on the part of the broker is 
complete and he is entitled to his compensation, notwithstanding 
--
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the owner's refusal to go through with the transaction. In 
Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927 (1953), a 
broker obtained the signature of a purchaser on the usual 
printed form Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement which 
recited the terms of sale contained in the listing agreement, 
with the agreed down payment. After a series of negotiations, 
the sellers refused to sell to the prospective buyers on the 
terms of the listing agreement. Thereafter, the sellers 
brought an action against the broker to recover money which 
he had kept as commission for arranging the sale. The 
Court, on an appeal by the defendant-broker from a judgment 
adverse to him in the trial court, held that the broker was 
entitled to his commission. 
[2] That agreement certainly con-
templated that the plaintiff would cooper-
ate in good faith toward the accomplishment 
of the purpose for which he employed defendant. 
He cannot be permitted to procure them to 
obtain a buyer, on terms accepted by the 
plaintiff, and then prevent the accomplish-
ment of what he requested and authorized them 
to do by arbitrarily refusing to perform his 
part of the transaction. Under such circum-
stances, he will not be heard to complain of 
their failure to do that which he prevented. 
(Citing cases and 169 A.L.R. 605). Hoyt 
v. Wasatch Homes, supra, at 930. --
And in the recent case of Davis v. Health Development Com~ 
558 P.2d 594 (Utah, 1976) the Court reaffirmed this rule by 
saying: 
Plaintiff Davis's Claim of Commission 
[5] Plaintiff Davis makes the argument 
that the plan submitted for obtaining finan-
cing and the purchase by Mrs. Housely and 
Mrs. Brinton fulfilled his obligation under 
the listing contract to obtain a ready, willing 
-18-
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and able buyer, wherefore, he should be entitled 
to his commission. He supports this argument 
if an agent so performs, and the sale is not 
completed because of lack of cooperation or 
obstruction by the listor (the defendant co-
rporation), the agent is nevertheless entitled 
to his commission. 
Plaintiffs submit that the cases of Curtis, Hoyt, and 
Davis clearly state the rule that a real estate broker is 
entitled to commission, regardless of the enforceability of 
any agreement between the vendor and the purchaser, if the 
broker produces a ready, willing and able buyer who is 
prevented from purchasing by an act of the vendor. 
In the present case, it was the erroneous conclusion by 
Mr. Anderson that the time for acceptance had expired, 
coupled with the offer by Mr. Boley to purchase the property 
that caused the Andersons to refuse to consummate the deal. 
In fact, when the Norrises met with Anderson on the 19th of 
January, he told them that if they had accepted the offer 
within five days they would have bought the place. (T. 24). 
Clearly the refusal to sell was the decision of the Andersons, 
Hall, and Boley and not the Norrises. The plaintiff, Taylor 
National Real Estate, is consequently entitled to a commission 
of six percent (6%) on the proposed purchase price of $250,000.00. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs, LKL Associates, timely accepted the 
renewal of the defendants' offer, thereby entitling them to 
specific performance. It was the miscalculation of the 
Andersons and the advice and offer of Boley Realty that 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prevented the sale from culminating. The plaintiff should 
not be prevented from a legitimate purchase by the actions 
of the sellers and their realtor. For these same reasons, 
the plaintiff, Taylor National Real Estate is entitled to 
its duly earned commission. 
Respectfully submitted this /7r{ day 
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